In this essay I shall focus very generally on some of the special issues that arise in the context of developing countries that the literature on Law and Economics needs to address if it is to be applicable there. These special issues arise primarily because the institutional, political and behavioral context in these countries is different from the usual context of the literature.
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'Rule of law' should also include other rights, some quite different from mere security of property rights. For example, one part may involve various democratic rights of political participation, association, mobilization, and expression of 'voice'. An analysis of crosscountry variations in human development indicators (which includes education or health variables like mass literacy or life expectation) shows that an institutional variable measuring 'voice' or participation rights is just as important as that measuring security of property rights as an explanatory variable--see Bardhan (2005) , chapter 1. In other words, the part of 'rule of law' that refers to democratic participation rights explains a significant amount of variations in human development indices across countries. Those who emphasize property rights often ignore the effects of participatory rights, and there is some obvious tension between these two types of rights included in the standard package of 'rule of law'.
The idea of security of property rights has been extended to the case of intellectual property rights for the preservation of incentives for innovation. Since innovations are the main source of economic growth, laxity in the enforcement of international patents and copyrights in developing countries for products that are knowledge-intensive or require expensive investments in research and development is often regarded as harmful for longterm economic growth. This has been the rationale for the incorporation of TRIPS (traderelated intellectual property rights) in WTO rules, when developing countries accepted these rules under some pressure from rich countries. While keeping incentives alive for new research and innovations is extremely important, the question from the point of view of a developing country is usually if the enormous costs (including the often exorbitant monopoly prices charged by the patent holder for a prolonged period 2 ) are always worth the benefits and if there are better alternative ways of encouraging research. It is recognized now by many scientific researchers that existing patents often act as an obstacle to further research that tries to build on earlier findings (in developing countries this includes research for adapting new technology to the special conditions there). This 4 is linked with the question of the optimal patent breadth, which is about how broadly the protection of existing innovations ought to extend to related innovations in the future.
The alternative method of subsidizing research inputs (rather than rewarding research output with temporary monopoly) has the advantage of encouraging information sharing and collaborative research. Of course, upfront funding carries with it the moral hazard problem that researchers, once having secured funding, may be tempted to pursue activities or lines of research other than those most desired by the public sponsor. This problem may be mitigated if researchers expect to apply for public funding in future. and donor agencies and governments to a commitment to purchase vaccines to be developed by pharmaceutical companies against some of these diseases. For a discussion of the incentive issues in vaccine purchase commitments, see Kremer (2001) . For other diseases (like diabetes or cancer) which kill large numbers of people in both rich and poor countries the incentive argument for enforcing patents in poor countries is weak, since that research will be carried out by the transnational drug companies in any case as the market in rich countries is large enough (provided resale can be limited).
We have earlier commented upon the different kinds of security of property rights being relevant for different social groups. In the case of intellectual property rights as well the transaction costs may limit the symmetry of access of different groups to those rights. Khan and Sokoloff (1998) , in a historical comparison of the patent systems in the US and Britain in the first half of the 19th century, show that while the British system used to effectively limit access to intellectual property rights to the relatively wealthy and wellconnected, access in the American system was much more broad-based, and this contributed to a much more vigorous and wider spread of patenting activity in the US in that period. There are also corresponding implications for the inadequacy of just a legal framework in developing credit and equity markets or the requisite financial infrastructure in general. Why doesn't a society always adapt its legal and institutional set-up to facilitate productivity-enhancing innovations? Such innovations have gainers and losers, but in most cases the gainers could potentially compensate the losers. The problem is that it is politically difficult for the gainers from a change to credibly commit to compensate the losers ex post. 4 As puts it, there may not be any political Coase 7 Theorem, whereby politicians and powerful social groups could make a deal with the rest of society, giving up some of their control on existing rules and institutions that are inefficient, allow others to choose policies and institutions that bring about improvements in productivity, and then redistribute part of the gains to those politicians and groups.
II
Such deals have severe commitment problems; those in power cannot credibly commit to not using this power in the process, and others cannot credibly commit to redistribute once the formerly powerful really give up their power for the sake of bringing about new rules and institutions.
A central issue of development economics is thus the persistence of dysfunctional regulations and institutions over long periods of time, as we discuss in Bardhan (2005) importantly, a deficiency in every citizen's expectations about others' compliance, which form the foundation of the rule of law. Along with the underlying power distribution and enforcement mechanisms in society, some overarching social norms and political commitments provide the main structure within the confines of which the formal legal system operates, and compared to the former the latter--which is the focus of much of the Law and Economics literature--is often in a secondary role.
These important elements of the institutional, political and social framework are ignored in a recent burgeoning of empirical literature on the effects of legal origins of a system.
La Porta et al (1997, 1999) have called attention to the superior effects, across countries, of the Anglo-Saxon common-law system based on judicial precedents over the civil-law system based on formal codes, on corporate business environment both in terms of more flexibility with changing needs of business and in terms of better protection for external suppliers of finance to a company (whether shareholders or creditors). Apart from some doubts about the establishment of causality in these cross-national studies 5 , one can also question the historical evidence even in the rich countries themselves. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (forthcoming) have done a comparative study of the constraints imposed by their respective legal system on organizational choices of business in the US (with its common law system) and France (with its civil law codes) during the middle of the 19th century around the time when both countries were beginning to industrialize. They conclude that there was nothing inherent in the French legal regime that created either a lack of flexibility or a lack of attention to the rights of creditors or small stakeholders.
Many of the rules in the US for minority shareholder rights actually came after the insider scandals of the Great Depression period. Franks et al (2003) In any case, as we have indicated earlier, how important the legacy of the formal legal system is rather moot where much too frequently in developing countries the enforcement of whatever the laws are in the statute books is quite weak, and the courts are hopelessly clogged and corrupt. Take the two largest developing countries, China and India. India has inherited the English common-law system, and being a democracy legal rights there 10 are more well-defined and the legal system less subject to political discretion than in In many developing countries the efficiency of courts as mechanisms of resolving disputes or enforcing contracts is shaped by a rather warped system of incentives: judges, even when they are not corrupt, do not care about delays, lawyers earn more when court proceedings are prolonged, appeals are too easy and some defendants deliberately seek continual delay in judgment. Courts are congested because of too lengthy procedures and built-in incentives for over-litigation, apart from administrative delays in appointments of judges. Such low judicial effectiveness in commercial law, apart from raising transaction costs all around, has important effects on the size and structure of firms. This is because the more effective the judicial process, the more you can have relatively complex contracts, larger firms can thrive and more complex goods produced.
III
Finally, we are going to comment on some of the broad presumptions of the Law and Economics literature which may need to be changed or made more flexible if it is to be applied to developing countries. One relates to the scale of economic activity. In small peasant communities where the scale of economic activity is not large informal relational contracts may be more efficient than rule-based contracts supported by elaborate legal- 14 were banned it would have resulted in welfare-enhancing credit opportunities for the peasant. Basu (2000) models a somewhat similar case of a woman choosing a 'sexual harassment contract' where she would have otherwise been better off if such contracts were disallowed. Similar cases can be argued for legally taking out the option for a poor worker to work in unsafe or hazardous conditions. These are all cases for interventionist regulations in the context of extremely unequal but 'voluntary' contracts.
Let us end with a comment on a fashionable attitude to the rule of law in the context of development that is sometimes expressed at the opposite end of the political spectrum.
We have indicated earlier in this section as well at the beginning of this essay that the rule of law is often an instrument in the hands of the propertied ruling over and restricting the activities of the propertyless. This undoubted fact sometimes leads commentators to dismiss the rule of law merely as an instrument of class oppression or as part of a modernizing elitist project that rides roughshod over the 'subaltern'. In the face of such tendentious simplifications we can do no better than to quote here from the far more nuanced historical analysis of E. P. Thompson. At the conclusion of his 1975 book,
Whigs and Hunters (which shows how a political oligarchy in 18 th century England invented callous and oppressive laws to serve its own interests) Thompson writes:
"We reach, then, not a simple conclusion (law = class power) but a complex and contradictory one. On the one hand, it is true that the law did mediate existent class relations to the advantage of the rulers….On the other hand, the law mediated these class relations through legal forms, which imposed, again and again, inhibitions upon the actions of the rulers….In a context of gross class inequalities, the equity of the law must always be in some part sham…We ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath this law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good. To deny or belittle this good is…a desperate error of intellectual abstraction." (pp.264-66) 
